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## SECURITY COUNCIL

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### DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMITTEE

Under the *UN Charter*, the Security Council has the responsibility of maintaining international peace. It is the most powerful body of the United Nations; while other committees can only make recommendations for action, the Security Council makes decisions that its member bodies must implement. The Security Council meets throughout the year to address the most serious security issues facing the UN and the world.

The Council is made up of 15 nations: five are permanent members and the remaining 10 seats rotate every two years among the nations in the General Assembly. The five permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Each of these nations has “veto power,” which means that whenever any one of these countries votes “no” on a resolution, that resolution automatically fails. In order for a resolution to pass, it must receive a unanimous vote.

The Security Council may deal with international conflict in many ways. When fighting breaks out, the Council’s first goal is usually to call for a ceasefire—an end to violence. It may also send peacekeeping forces to protect citizens and ensure that any UN decisions are carried out. The Security Council can use more forceful measures to achieve its goals as well, such as issuing economic sanctions, measures that prevent a country from receiving money or trade. In the most serious circumstances, the Security Council can order the use of military force.

### TOPIC: SITUATION IN DARFUR

#### INTRODUCTION

Darfur, a Sudanese province, has been the site of some of the worst violence and oppression in all of war-ravaged Sudan. The crisis in Darfur broke out in 2003, while Sudan’s government was already engaged in bloody civil war, the North-South war. The North-South conflict was Africa’s longest-running civil war, lasting from 1983 to 2005 and claiming over two million lives—but the fragile peace that has been achieved is still threatened by the violence that continues to rage in Darfur.<sup>1,2</sup>

The North-South conflict involved the mostly Arab Muslim population in the North and the mostly black Christian population in the South. In 1983, Christian-dominated southern areas rebelled against attempts by the Muslim-dominated government in the North to force Islam onto



the whole country and to control the South's oil resources. Meanwhile, discontent was brewing in Darfur.

Many Darfuris believed the government was neglecting the Darfur region, and oppressing the non-Arab Darfuris. (While the majority of Darfuris are Muslim, most are not ethnic Arabs.) Twenty years after the start of the North-South war, while Sudan's military was preoccupied with the North-South war, dissatisfied Darfuris saw an opportunity to rise up: Darfuri rebels attacked government-controlled areas including police stations and military outposts. The rebellion is not unified; it is composed of many small rebel groups and two large ones, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (Jem).

The government, whose military was already overextended by the North-South conflict, began supporting militias that it hoped would suppress the rebellion in Darfur. These militias only increased the violence: reports of brutality against civilian Darfuris soon gained international attention. One of the most brutal militias is the **Janjaweed**—Janjaweed fighters reportedly ride into villages on horseback, murder civilians, rape women, steal valuables and burn houses.

The Sudanese government insists that it does not support the Janjaweed or any human rights abusers. Human rights groups, government officials around the world and representatives of the United Nations disagree. They say that the government is not trying hard enough to stop the violence against the people of Darfur.

#### MAP OF SUDAN



Source: Wikipedia.com

### WHAT CAUSED SUDAN'S NORTH-SOUTH CIVIL WAR?

Religious conflict: Christians in the south began to fight the government after it imposed *sharia*—a form of strict Islamic law.

Conflict over distribution of oil money: The oil company Chevron discovered oil in Sudan in the 1970s. Southern rebels began to fight against the government in 1983 because they believed the oil money was only going to the North.

*Source*: “Sudan and Southern Rebels Sign Pact to End Civil War,” *New York Times*, January 1, 2005.

### WHAT CAUSED THE CRISIS IN DARFUR?

Marginalization: Southern rebel groups the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) say that Darfur has been neglected by the government. Their province is underdeveloped, and remains so because Darfuris are not Arabs, the rebels say.

*Source*: [www.savedarfur.org](http://www.savedarfur.org)

## BACKGROUND

Today, the situation in Darfur is considered one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. The fighting has claimed tens of thousands of lives, and more than two million people have been forced to flee their homes. Many have had to flee across the border as **refugees** to Chad, causing tensions with that country.<sup>3</sup>

Some countries consider the violence to be **genocide**, the deliberate attempt to wipe out people of a particular race, religion or nationality. In particular, the United States believes that the Janjaweed are guilty of committing genocide against the black Sudanese living in Darfur.

### CRITICAL THINKING

*Some countries that are calling for peacekeeping action in Darfur say that the Muslim government is committing a genocide aimed at the black Christians in Darfur. Others note that the civilians living in Darfur are actually Muslims too and that both sides are black. How might countries' reactions to the situation in Sudan be affected by their positions on other political issues, such as the “War on Terror”? How will these issues affect your country's position on the situation in Darfur?*

### *Violence prevents vital humanitarian aid*

According to the United Nations Mission in Sudan, government police forces have also been raiding refugee camps. In early November 2004, police entered the Al Geer camp and destroyed shacks, shot into the air and shouted at the refugees. UN agencies assisting the refugees withdrew personnel due to concerns for their safety.<sup>4</sup>



In December 2004, rebel forces attacked a town in Darfur and government forces retaliated—bringing humanitarian aid to a halt. The **UN World Food Programme (WFP)** was forced to stop a group of food-carrying trucks heading to the area. As a result, 260,000 people went without food.<sup>5</sup>

Nearly two million Darfuris have been driven from their homes. Most of these people are now living in camps. The WFP has fed millions, but many people are still starving because it is too dangerous for humanitarian aid to reach them. If fighting continues, the WFP warns, it is likely that many of these people will starve.<sup>6</sup>

#### *A ceasefire in the civil war, but more violence in Darfur*

Three long years of peace talks regarding the North-South civil war finally led to the signing of a “permanent ceasefire” on December 31, 2004. But the ceasefire already faces grave challenges: Factions from the North and South will have to overcome twenty years of hostility to put together a **power-sharing government**.<sup>7</sup> Militias and rebel groups must both be disarmed,<sup>8</sup> and both groups will eventually have to combine to form a unified Sudanese military.<sup>9</sup> Both sides must achieve these goals with very little international aid (countries that have promised developmental assistance have not met their pledges<sup>10</sup>).

Even at the conclusion of war, civilians may continue to suffer. As the country tries to establish peace around 1.2 million of the four million people displaced during the war will return to their towns in southern Sudan, estimates the United Nations. Providers of social services such as schools and hospitals will likely be overwhelmed by the large number of returning refugees.<sup>11</sup>

#### **A PEACE AGREEMENT FOR SUDAN**

The ceasefire agreement is designed to distribute power and resources between the North and the South in Sudan:

- There will be a separate assembly, or law-making body, in southern Sudan.
- The leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the main southern rebel group, will be named vice-president. The old government will now share power with former rebel groups.
- Money made from selling Sudan’s oil will be split evenly between the North and the South.
- The rebel groups and the government will join their armed forces into one army.
- The southern Sudanese, many of whom want to **secede** (form a new country) will be given the opportunity to vote in 2011 about whether to remain a part of Sudan or become their own country. This vote is likely to be a source of conflict in the future.

*Source: “When the Time Comes to Stop Killing; Peacemaking in Africa,” The Economist, January 8, 2005.*

And though the war between the North and the South officially ended on January 9, 2005, the war in Darfur carried on—and escalated. Jan Pronk, the Secretary-General’s special representative for Sudan said, “December [2004] saw a build-up of arms, attacks of positions, including air attacks, raids on small towns and villages, increased banditry and more looting.”<sup>12</sup> The violence was so severe that neither the UN nor NGOs were able to provide aid.



### *Conflict in Darfur persists*

Even if Sudan is able to meet all of the difficult challenges of its peace agreement, Darfur will be a serious threat to maintaining peace. Several ceasefires had been signed in Darfur between rebels and the government, but they were quickly violated by both sides. Ceasefires and peace agreements in Darfur “mean nothing at all,” complained John Danforth, the former US ambassador to the United Nations and former special envoy to Sudan.

The continued violence in Darfur and the harsh policies of the Sudanese government have led many observers to question whether the government is really committed to peace at all. Some in the Sudanese government see the ongoing conflict in Darfur as proof that rebels need to be stopped once and for all through even harsher treatment. Meanwhile, some rebels in the South believe that the conflict in Darfur will weaken the government. They may be tempted to go back to war, believing the government can be toppled. Without peace in Darfur, the agreement between the North and the South cannot be guaranteed.

But some international observers are optimistic, believing that the North-South agreement could be a model for a future agreement in Darfur. “It provides a possible model for resolving the Darfur problem in power-sharing and in resource-sharing,” explained former ambassador Danforth.<sup>13</sup> The hope is that Darfur will be able to follow the example of the rest of the country, so that Sudan can be at peace for the first time in decades.

However, the violence has not stopped. “The government launched a massive attack in Darfur just as they were in Abuja for the last round of peace talks with the rebels reaffirming their commitment to a ceasefire,” said Julie Flint, a human rights worker in Sudan. The situation remains very unstable.<sup>14</sup>

#### **DANGER FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS IN DARFUR**

The militias have used rape and sexual violence as weapons of war against the women and girls of the Darfur region. There is also evidence of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers from the African Union. A female refugee from the West Darfur town of Disa describes how she was assaulted by militiamen:

“I was sleeping when the attack on Disa started. I was taken away by the attackers, they were all in uniforms. They took dozens of other girls and made us walk for three hours. During the day we were beaten and they were telling us: “You, the black women, we will exterminate you, you have no god.” At night we were raped several times. The Arabs guarded us with arms and we were not given food for three days.”

*Source: “Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war: sexual violence and its consequences,” Amnesty International, May 2004.*

#### **PAST INTERNATIONAL ACTION**

The UN Security Council passed several resolutions in 2004 condemning the violence in Darfur and welcoming the gradual progress made in the North-South conflict. Resolution 1547



established a special political observer mission to Sudan for a period of three months. This mission helped improve contact between the government and rebel groups and was extended by 90 days through Resolution 1556. Since the signing of the agreement, the UN Security Council created a peacekeeping force to monitor the new North-South agreement.

In 2005, a UN mission was established to go to Darfur to see if genocide was in fact occurring, as the United States said. The mission concluded that although very serious abuses of human rights were occurring, it could not accurately be called genocide. It called for war crimes trials for those who were responsible for the abuses.<sup>15</sup>

In April 2006, the World Food Programme announced it would cut in half the food rations for Darfuri refugees. Donor countries did not meet their pledges, officials said, so the WFP would be unable to provide food aid in the amount needed. “Haven’t the people of Darfur suffered enough?” asked WFP chief James Morris.<sup>16</sup> Later, Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that Sudan’s government was violating international humanitarian law by preventing food, fuel and relief aid to civilians in the Darfur province.<sup>17</sup>

In May 2006, the largest rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Army, agreed to sign a peace deal with the government. But Jem and other rebel groups refused. Though the government and SLA both went ahead with the agreement, UN reports later indicated that the government did not maintain its pledge to halt attack on civilians.<sup>18</sup>

African Union troops have been stationed in Darfur to help establish peace, but the AU does not have the money to sustain a peacekeeping force there. The government of Sudan has firmly opposed a UN peacekeeping mission.<sup>19</sup> Though a November 2006 agreement allowed for the creation of a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force as large as 27,000 troops, the arrangements are only tentative. The government continues to resist peacekeeping forces. “They are refusing to let the international community come in and assist,” Secretary-General Annan said of the Sudanese government. “They will be held individually and collectively responsible for what is happening and what happens.”<sup>20</sup>

Some countries have suggested that the Security Council should impose **sanctions** against Sudanese oil.<sup>21</sup> Sanctions are a way of punishing a country if it does not comply with a Security Council resolution. In this case, member states would not be allowed to purchase oil from Sudan, which would hurt Sudan’s economy, and would hopefully compel Sudan’s government to stop supporting the human rights abuses in Darfur. Currently, some members of the Security Council are opposed to sanctions. Several countries rely on Sudanese oil, so sanctions would be also be damaging to their economies.

Other UN member states have tried to convince the new Human Rights Council to issue a resolution condemning the militias and Sudanese government for using rape and violence against civilians as a tactic of war—but the resolutions have been defeated. Instead, the Council has sent “fact-finding missions” to Darfur, and has called for an “immediate end to the ongoing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, with a special focus on vulnerable groups, including women and children, while not hindering the return of all internally displaced persons to their homes.”<sup>22</sup> Human rights groups have criticized this response as “lukewarm.”<sup>23</sup>



### **CRITICAL THINKING**

*Why might Sudan not want the UN to send in a peacekeeping force? Why might the members of the Human Rights Council be reluctant to condemn the Sudanese government for human rights abuses?*

### **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FORMULATING A RESOLUTION**

Delegates should address the following when creating draft resolutions:

- Discussing your nation's willingness to contribute aid or peacekeeping troops and whether your nation will provide support to the AU's peacekeeping work or assist more directly, if at all;
- Suggest measures to Sudan and the international community to achieve peace;
- Recommend ways to aid refugees and displaced persons given that many villages have been destroyed and that violence still inhibits aid distribution; and
- Discuss the possibility of prosecuting human rights abuses: Who should be held accountable?

### **QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER**

1. What type of action does your country support in Sudan?
2. Does religion play a role in how your country sees the conflict in Sudan?
3. Does your country support strong stance against the Sudanese government?
4. Has your country contributed funds to the peacekeeping or humanitarian efforts in Sudan?
5. What does your country think about imposing sanctions against Sudanese oil?

## TERMS AND CONCEPTS

**Ceasefire**: an agreement between groups in conflict to stop the violence.

**Genocide**: any intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group through violence.

**Janjaweed**: the militia that has been responsible for human rights abuses in Darfur. While the Sudanese government states that it does not support the Janjaweed, many human rights groups believe the government uses the militia to oppress and abuse the people in Darfur.

**Marginalization**: being put in a position of less importance, influence or power.

**Power-sharing government**: a government composed of opposing groups, which must share governing power and decision-making authority.

**Refugees**: people who are seeking asylum, or safety, in another country because they fear persecution or violence in their own country.

**Sanctions**: A type of punishment that is meant to force a country to comply with an international law. Economic sanctions prevent a country from trading or receiving money or trade.

**Secede**: to withdraw from a country, with the intention of creating a new, separate country.

**UN World Food Programme (WFP)**: a UN agency that provides food aid to populations in need.

## SOURCES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

News articles assembled by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

[www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

Sudan, Global Policy Forum

[www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudanindex.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudanindex.htm)

CBC News Timeline of Darfur Crisis

[www.cbc.ca/news/background/sudan/darfur.html](http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/sudan/darfur.html)





## TOPIC: TROOP SAFETY AND SECURITY

### INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping has become one of the most recognizable responsibilities of the United Nations. Peacekeeping missions vary in their personnel and objectives, but their principle remains the same: by acting as an impartial force on the ground during a conflict, missions can encourage warring parties to come to a peaceful resolution. Since 1948, the Security Council has used peacekeeping missions to promote peace and offer safety to civilians in conflict regions.

In total, there have been 63 United Nations peacekeeping operations involving hundreds of thousands of personnel around the world.<sup>24</sup> At the same time, 2,431 military and civilian peacekeepers have died while serving on missions.<sup>25</sup> As of December 2007, United Nations peacekeeping deployment had reached a historic high with 83,854 military and police personnel and some 15,000 civilians serving in peace operations around the world.<sup>26</sup>

Only the Security Council can authorize a peacekeeping operation and decide upon its **mandate**. Of the Council's 15 members, nine must vote in favor of a mission for it to be implemented. In addition, none of the five permanent Security Council members (China, France, Russian Federation, United States and United Kingdom) can vote against the mission. Once the mission is approved, the Secretary-General of the UN makes recommendations as to how and when it should be carried out. Then, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides the direction and support for the operation.

Peacekeeping operations are financed by all Member States of the UN according to their relative wealth. Developed nations typically pay more for the peacekeeping budget while developing nations contribute more troops and civilian police personnel to peacekeeping missions. In addition to military personnel, police officers, human rights experts, **election observers** and communications engineers play important roles in peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping personnel come from some 112 countries. As of 31 October, the top 10 troop contributors were: Pakistan (10,594), Bangladesh (9,853), India (9,376), Nigeria (5,571), Nepal (3,675), Jordan (3,582), Ghana (3,399), Rwanda (2,984), Uruguay (2,583), and Italy (2,565)

Source: United Nations [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/)

Peacekeepers routinely face situations in which government structures are aggressive or have become useless, rebel groups violate **humanitarian law** and the UN's authority is ignored. In these environments, the safety of UN personnel becomes difficult to ensure.

The success of UN peacekeeping operations depends on a number of factors. Of course, successful missions require a strong commitment from and cooperation among Member States that contribute troops. But other factors include a genuine desire of the parties in the conflict to solve their differences, a clear mandate or set of goals for the mission, and adequate resources.



Member States have also realized that operations must be more “robust”—peacekeeping forces must have strong military forces so that warring parties do not try to attack UN personnel.

## BACKGROUND

Peacekeeping is a dangerous task that has become even more dangerous in recent years. Throughout the 1970s, an average of 18 peacekeeping troops and civilians were killed each year. In the 1980s, almost 21 peacekeepers were killed per year. But in the 1990s, this number jumped to over 80. And over the past three years, it crept even higher, to 116.<sup>27</sup> As these figures illustrate, despite advances in military technology, maintaining the safety of peacekeeping forces has become more difficult.

One reason for this is the changing nature of global conflict. Rarely are peacekeepers sent in to areas where they maintain truces between two nations. Today, peacekeepers are asked to quell civil wars and protect civilians from rebel groups that may not have a central authority or may be unwilling to compromise their goals. Similarly, the bombing of UN buildings in Iraq on August 19, 2003 proved how vulnerable UN representatives can be, even if they are not involved in peacekeeping operations. In most cases, those who commit violence against peacekeeping troops or other UN representatives are never brought to justice in a court of law.

### CRITICAL THINKING

*Why do you think it may be more difficult for peacekeepers to protect civilians against groups without a central authority? Why might peacekeepers be targeted by rebel groups or warring factions? What are the dangers in serving as election observers?*

In some instances, peacekeeping missions are placed in danger not only because of local violence, but also as a result of the actions of neighboring nations not involved in the conflict. According to an important 2000 UN report on peacekeeping, the *Brahimi Report*, “neighboring states can contribute to the problem by allowing passage of conflict-supporting contraband, serving as middlemen for it or providing base areas for fighters.”<sup>28</sup> So even if a nation does not support rebel fighters, its lack of legal restrictions, border controls and political strength may increase the dangers for UN personnel.

Dangers also arise when troops enter peacekeeping operations without the proper training, resources and equipment. SCPKO has called for organized training mechanisms for peacekeeping troops in the past, but these measures have not been fully implemented.<sup>29</sup> Currently, nations can contribute troops to a mission but are not required to train or prepare them in a certain way. But poorly trained troops are a danger not only to themselves, but to the other soldiers in their unit who rely on them. And some countries have even supplied troops with no rifles, helmets, protective gear or transport (such as trucks or troop carriers).<sup>30</sup>

Peacekeeping is also made more difficult when a mission does not have a clear mandate. In the past however, the **UN Secretariat**, which makes recommendations to the Security Council on the structure and make-up of each mission, has been accused of telling the Council what it wants to hear instead of what it needs to hear. In the end, the Security Council must authorize



peacekeeping missions, so if the Council deems a particular mission too dangerous or risky, which became increasingly common following several failed missions in the 1990s, it will hold off on approving it. As a result, some argue that the Secretariat has downplayed security concerns in order to get at least a minimal number of peacekeepers into a conflict area. But as the *Brahimi Report* points out, “to deploy a partial force incapable of solidifying a fragile peace would first raise and then dash the hopes of a population engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damage the credibility of the United Nations as a whole.”<sup>31</sup> With this in mind, it is important for both the Council and the Secretariat to be realistic about the needs of a peacekeeping operation.

The same is true for the authorization to use force. If peacekeepers do not have clear guidelines regarding when it is and is not appropriate to use force, they will either be reluctant to counter attacks or place others in danger.

Finally, the UN has called on Member States to provide more information and expertise regarding troop protection and safety measures. With the rise in global anti-terrorism campaigns, many nations have established security forces devoted to protecting others in hostile environments. But the UN itself does not have these types of resources. Member States themselves must provide the knowledge and logistics to establish comprehensive security programs for UN personnel in the field.

## PAST INTERNATIONAL ACTION

The security of UN personnel has been one of the organization’s primary concerns for decades. Following are some of the documents and policies meant to improve security for UN peacekeepers.

### *Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel*

In response to the increasing number of fatalities on UN peacekeeping operations, Member States drafted a convention on December 9, 1994 outlining the legal actions that should be taken to protect UN personnel around the world. The convention prohibits any kind of attack, not only on UN officials, but also on associated personnel—individuals from either nations or nongovernmental organizations working with the UN in some way.

The convention also states that nations must allow UN personnel free and safe passage through their territories, and must do everything in their power to protect them.<sup>32</sup> The convention also calls on countries to punish anyone who commits violence against UN and associated personnel to the fullest extent of their national law. Finally, it states that any nation in which someone attacks a UN representative must either prosecute the attacker or **extradite** them.

Importantly, the convention laid down many basic legal measures regarding the safety of UN personnel for the first time. As of 2003, the convention had been ratified by only 69 nations (though an additional 43 had signed it, meaning they are willing to continue debating its principles).<sup>33</sup>



## *Brahimi Report*

Peacekeeping missions have changed rapidly in recent history. In the late 1990s, peacekeeping missions took on new responsibilities in Kosovo and East Timor, imposing social, political and economic programs to help ease the transition into peace.<sup>34</sup> In these missions—and those in Lebanon, Congo and Sierra Leone—the UN realized too few peacekeepers were being deployed, and those who were deployed were insufficiently prepared for the challenges they would face. In Sierra Leone, for example, 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage by the rebel Revolutionary United Front.<sup>35</sup>

In response, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened an expert panel to address all aspects of UN peacekeeping operations in March of 2000. The panel's report—titled the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, also known as the *Brahimi Report* after the panel's chairman, former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi—provided a comprehensive overview of the challenges facing peacekeeping operations. It also offered many candid suggestions for reforming the peacekeeping process.

The report recommended substantial increases in funding for peacekeeping missions, specifically creating a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund of US\$50 million for the Secretary-General to use in setting up peacekeeping missions. The report also recommended more funding for the Electoral Assistance Division, to ensure that peacekeepers are well equipped to observe and protect elections in post-conflict countries.<sup>36</sup>

The report also recommends creating an “interim criminal code,” a set of laws that UN peacekeepers could apply to the conflict region they occupy, in case the local government is too hostile or ineffective to implement its own system of laws. It requests more resources be allocated to improving communications technology, especially Internet technology, for peacekeeping missions and for peacekeeping personnel.<sup>37</sup> It also recommends that Member States adopt new policies, as well. Member states should create a national list of civilian police officers and civilian specialists who would be able to deploy on peacekeeping missions on short notice.<sup>38</sup>

In 2004, the UN released a document called “The *Brahimi Report: Four Years On*,” which addressed the recommendations that were implemented and those that were not. Communication within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and between peacekeepers in the field and in headquarters had been strengthened. “Rapid Deployment Teams,” “Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority,” “Strategic Deployment Stocks” and the “Integrated Mission Task Force”—all mechanisms intended to improve the speed and efficiency of peacekeeping operations—had been implemented. All of these mechanisms have since been used in peacekeeping missions.

However, some *Brahimi Report* recommendations had yet to be implemented. The roles of other organizations in peacekeeping operations need be clarified so that UN peacekeepers know how to best interact with those organizations in the field.<sup>39</sup> And by 2007, the UN still has yet to create a comprehensive interim criminal code, a matter of much focus and controversy today.<sup>40</sup>



And the *Brahimi Report* has since been the target of criticism. Experts criticize its focus on managing the consequences of conflict, rather than addressing the politics that lead to and perpetuate conflict. It is also criticized for not focusing on the needs of specific regions, especially Africa, where 85% of UN peacekeeping personnel are deployed. Some experts say that the UN should empower regional organizations to deal with peacekeeping, rather than only strengthening the UN's own peacekeeping operations. And finally, even though peacekeeping operations are improving now, further progress depends on Member States' support. As soon as Member States lose interest, peacekeeping operations may deteriorate to pre-*Brahimi Report* levels. Only by ensuring that Member States are committed to the practice of peacekeeping can peacekeeping tactics and operations be fully improved.<sup>41</sup>

#### **CRITICAL THINKING**

*Why do you think the peacekeeping operations began to take on new responsibilities like economic, social and political programs? Why do you think the UN is being encouraged to increase its focus on political programs for conflict regions? Could these programs be seen as interfering with a country's **sovereignty**? How might this lead to controversy?*

#### *Other Measures*

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has also taken several steps to improve peacekeeping measures, including the review of existing training programs. Currently, DPKO is attempting to develop a "Standardized Generic Training Module" in order to make troop combat training more uniform among troop-contributing countries. This way, all soldiers in a mission will have the same basic experiences and understanding of their duties as peacekeepers.

#### **CRITICAL THINKING**

*In 2002, UN refugee workers and peacekeepers in the Congo admitted to sexually abusing some refugee women and children. Since this shocking revelation, the UN has taken measures to prevent similar abuse by UN officials. How can incidences like this one be prevented in the future? How might scandals like this one compromise the safety and security of UN peacekeepers?*

In 2002, SCPKO released a report recognizing a "sudden surge" in the number of peacekeeping missions conducted around the world, and calling for measures to make sure peacekeeping missions are organized quickly and effectively—troops must be able to deploy within 30 days of the adoption of a mandate. Missions must also be executed in a way that promotes safety and security for troops.<sup>42</sup>

A safe and successful peacekeeping mission also requires an open discussion about the operation's goals, functions and responsibilities. Here, the UN has stepped up consultations among troop-contributing nations, the Security Council and the Secretariat. But prior to any peacekeeping operation, standards must be set so that troops know exactly what their roles are and when it is proper to use force to protect either civilians or themselves. And while training of



peacekeepers is a nation's responsibility, SCPKO's 2002 report said, the UN should still make an effort to ensure these training standards are met.<sup>43</sup>

Ensuring this protection also requires the right equipment. SCPKO has encouraged all nations to provide at least a minimal amount of equipment for safety, but it is difficult to coordinate supplies, particularly since the UN has none of its own. Another important factor is how supplies can be brought to peacekeeping operations in the field. In its 2002 report, SCPKO requested the Secretariat to contract air- and sea-lift services in order to provide transportation for troops and supplies to conflict regions.<sup>44</sup> Many nations, even those that have not contributed troops, can be called upon to supply this type of equipment and supplies.

Finally, no matter how much armor, weapons or troops a peacekeeping mission has, it must have the knowledge and ability to understand conflict environments and how to implement safety measures. Here, Member States have shared their expertise with the Secretariat, but more could be done.

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FORMULATING A RESOLUTION

Delegates are asked to devise new ways to ensure the safety of peacekeeping troops in the field. However, several factors must be considered. Delegates should:

- Consider universal training standards or methods;
- Consider ways in which peacekeeping troops can be provided adequate weaponry and other supplies;
- Look to establish concrete methods of determining the actual needs of a peacekeeping operation, rather than just the needs that will allow the operation to be approved by the Security Council;
- Look into ways to address the causes of conflict, not just the consequences (for example, implementing programs to provide food security, economic stability and political stability, in addition to standard peacekeeping);
- Consider empowering regional organizations, especially those in Africa, where most of the UN's peacekeeping resources are needed; and
- Find ways to ensure Member States' long-term commitment to peacekeeping as a responsibility of the international community.

#### QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. Does your nation contribute troops to peacekeeping operations? If so, how many?
2. Has your nation ratified the *Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel*? If not, why?
3. Does your nation contribute supplies or resources for UN peacekeeping missions?
4. How can the UN improve and better coordinate training for peacekeepers?
5. How can the UN ensure that peacekeeping operations have legitimate goals and that troops know how and when to use force?
6. How can the UN improve and better coordinate security programs for peacekeeping missions?



## TERMS AND CONCEPTS

**Mandate:** the Security Council's decision on when to execute a peacekeeping mission, how to execute it, how long the mission will remain in place, and what level of force and troop size will be required to fulfill the mission.

**Election observers:** personnel who observe democratic elections in an unstable country, ensuring that the elections are not corrupted or compromised in any way.

**Brahimi Report:** the 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, also called the *Brahimi Report* after the panel's chairman, former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi. The report is a comprehensive overview of the challenges facing peacekeeping operations, and recommendations for meeting those challenges.

**UN Secretariat:** the United Nations' international staff around the world, carrying out the day-to-day work of the Organization. The Secretariat is composed of about 8,900 staff members. The Secretary-General is the head of the Secretariat. Secretariat members answer to the United Nations alone for their activities, and take an oath not to seek or receive instructions from any Government or outside authority.

**Extradite:** to give an alleged criminal to another country or legal body for prosecution

**Separation of the powers to ensure oneself independently:**

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